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IN

DUKANE

THE

SUPREME COURT

OF

THE

STATE

OF UTAH

CORPORATION,
PLAINTIFF/ RESPONDENT

VS.
CASE NO: 870015

BONNIE BIRCH,
DEFENDANT/ APPELLANT,

STATEMENT

OF

ISSUES

The issues in this case are as fallows:
1. Whether the lower court abused its discretion in
denying appellant's motions to set aside £he default judgment ?
2. Whether it was an error to enter a default judgment
without considering the merits of the case and due process
safeguards ?
3. Whether the " Scheduling Order and Trial Notice ff
as used by the District Court to enter a default is proper in
terms of its draft and in the face of due process requirements ?
4. Whether the lower courts shou|Ld consider certain
guidelines or consider certain elements of substantive and
procedural law in entering and finalizing dafault judgments ?
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' STATEMENT OF

THE

NATURE

OF

THE

CASE

The appellant, Bonnie Birch, appeals from the Order
of the Third District Court denying her motions to set aside
a default judgmetn in the sum of $ 200,000.00 becuase she failed
to appear at the time of pre-trial conference.The suit was
commenced against three defendants based on a surety agreement
for services and goods received by the other two defendants,
Jack W.Cranney and Cranney Productions Ltd. Defendants Jack W.
Cranney and Cranney Productions Ltd., filed their asnwers
admitting the surety agreement and receipts of services and goods
while defendant Bonnie Birch who is now divorced from defendant
Jack W.Cranney filed an answer denying signing the surety agreement and receiving any goods and services based on said surety
agreement.Appellant contended that her signatures were forged
by her then estrnaged husband. Appellant also went through the
deposition but failed to appear at the pre-trial conference as
she claimed that she did not receive any notices.In the course
of proceedings her attorney withdrew as she could not afford him.
The first notice of pre-trial conference was

mailed to him.

Her answer was stricken by the court at the time of pre-trial
conference on May 5,1987 and a judgment was entered against her
on May 13,1987. A motion to set aside the default judgment was
filed on October 5, 1986,

pursuant to the provisions of the

Ruies 60(b) and 55 Cc) of the Rules of Civil Procedure. Said
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motions were denied as the court ruled tlkem untimely. A notice
of appeal was filed properly on the 30th day of December 1986.

PROCEEDINGS AND DISPOSITION
IN THE COURT

BELOW

1. Respondent, Plaintiff below, filed an action on
May 13,1985 to recover for the goods and services rendered to
the defendants based on a guaranty deed yhich limited the claim
of the plaintiff to a total of $ 200,000,(Record Index No:26 &27).
2. Proper Answers were filed by the defendants.
3. Defendants Jack W.Cranney ancj his business entity
known as Cranney Productions Ltd. admitted the validity of the
guaranty deed and the receipt of goods arid services.
4. Appellant, defendant below, alt that time known as
Bonnie B.Cranney, denied signing the guaranty or receiving
any goods or services.
5.Appellant was represented by Klay M.Lewis Esq.,
who

withdrew

later as she could not affiord a counsel.

6. A partial summary judgment wa|s entered against
the Cranney Production Ltd., on December (27,1985 in the sum
of $ 282,056.42.
7. A default judgment was entereid against appellant
in the sum of $ 200,000.00 on May 5, 1986,, as she failed to
appear at the pe-trial conference. [RI:54|]
8. A series of motions to set aslide the default
judgment was commenced by the-.appellant starting the first one
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on October 5,1986 and the .last one being denied on the 16th
day of December 1986, thus foiiowed by a timely Notice of Appeal
on the 30th day of December 1986.

STATEMENT

OF

FACTS

The following facts are submitted :
l.The

Complaint filed by the plaintiff below did not

allege that appellant has received any goods and services from
the plaintiff.[RI:2-3]
2.Appellant denied signing of the guaranty document
in her Answer [RI:8-9A] and acknowledged in the Memorandum
of Stephen B.Mitchell Esq., attorney for respondent, in
support of his Motion for a partial summary judgment against
Cranney Productions Ltd. [RI:21j
3. Defendant Jack W.Cranney, ex-husband of the appellant
signed the guaranty, papers [RI: 26-27 J on the 29th day of March
1984, and the same dav visited the offices of his then legal
counsel, Carman Kipp to file for a

divorce from the appellant

and issues a chek to Mr.Kipp, a copy of which is attached herewith made part hereof as Exhibit: A.
4. Handwriting expert, John D.Moves, finds that the
signatures of appellant,Bonnie B.Cranney,

with a high degree

of probability may have been produced by the writer of the
other signatures. [RI-.99J The original Guaranty document is in
the possession.of respondent who,has refused its availability to
Mr.Moves or any other handwriting expert.
-4-

5. Affidavit of Donna W.Hagio states that
Jack W.Cranney, as a routine signed papers on behalf,of his
then

wife •

( the appellant )..

Affiant was an

employee of Jack W.Cranney and was still working on the 29th
dav of March 1984.
6. That after a full trial on the divorce matter
of Jack and Bonnie Cranney the Honorable Judith M.Billings
ruled as part of the Divorce Decree that Jack W.Cranney,
a defendant below, was obligated to pay the Dukane (Respondnet
herein) obligation. [Record Index No: 69 [I
7. That the Guaranty [RI:26] which is the basis
of this action limits its claim to a sum of $ 200,000. and
the Complaint filed by the respondent does not allege or
claim that the defendants are liable separately for said
sum but the lower Court has awarded three different judgments in the sums as follows :
I. Partial summary judgment against Cranney Productions
dated: 12.27.85 in the sum of $ 282,056.42 [RI:45-46]
II. Default Judgment against the appellant
dated: 5.13.87. in the sum of $ 200,000.00 [RI:58-59]
III.Summary Judgmment against defendant Jack W.Cranney
dated: 4.15.87 in the sum of

$200,000.00.

(No Record Index, since Request for Transcript filed prior
to the entry and signing of this judgment)
8. The Court records show that the Certificate
of Readiness for Trial and the Original Order for Scheduling
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Conference were mailed to the former legal counsel,Kay M.Lewis
Esq., of appellant [Record Index NO-.43 & 48] and she therefore,
was not expecting anything until informed , being pro se.
9.Appellant had denied receving any notices from the
court concerning any pre-trial conference and she has also
denied in her affidavit of knowing the nature of the proceedings
especially caught in her divorce matter as well [RI-.62-72]
10. Appellant has also shown that she did not recieve
some of her mail as it was sent back or forwarded to her exhusband who has put a change of address. [RI.62-72 & 100 J
11. That until a divorce between the defendants Jack
and Bonnie Cranney their last names were the same as: Cranney.
12. That the Scheduling Order and Trial Notice does not
provide for a default iudgment since its contents

do

not spell

out that a default judgment shall be entered in case a party
fails to respond or snow up pursuant to the provisions of Rule
4(c) of the Rules of Civil Procedure.[RI:56]
13. That the lower Court has not only stricken the
pleadings of appellant but also entered a default iudgment
simultaneously even though neither the caption nor the«
contents of the "Scheduling Order And Trial Notice

M

provide

for such a penalty as a default judgment. [RI:56 & 57]
14. That at the time of entering the default the
lower court had the notice that appellant was taking care of
her legal matters pro se [ RI: 50]
-6-

15. That appellant not knowing the legal
process did call several times the offic|es of Stephen B.
Mitchell Esq., attorney for respondent ajnd did write a
letter to Mr.Mitchell to take care of the default judgment.
A copy of said letter is attached herewith and made part
hereof as Exhibit: B.
16. That appellant though not knowing the
3 month time limit to set aside the default still acted
dutifully and diligently to resolve this matter as she
wrote a letter to Mr.Mitchell and respondent on July 10,
1986, when her phone calls were not returned.Exhibit:B
17. That a default judgment against her was
entered on May 13,1986.

[RI:58.|.

18. That appellant

was alsq available for

her deposition on October 28,1985 at the request of
respondent's

attorney.

SUMMARY

OF ARGUMENT

The lower court abused its discretion in
denying appellant's motion to set aside the default judgment
in that it failed to consider and ponder the factors.purposes,
and guidelines set bv the Rules and the higher court decisions:
as outlined in eacn point of argument -specially ignoring lack of
notice in the face of due process requirements.
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ARGUMENT
POINT

I

A COURT SHOULD CONSIDER THE FOLLOWING FACTORS IN
EXERCISING ITS DISCRETION IN GRANTING OR DENYING A MOTION
TO SET ASIDE A DEFAULT JUDGMENT UNDER RULES 55(c) AND 60(b):
1.Whether the plaintiff will be prejudiced;
2.Whether the defendant has a meritorious defense;
3.Whether the default was the result of the
defendant's culpable conduct.
United States v. $55518.05 in U.S.Currency 728 F.2d.192 (1984)
The threshold question in this case is whether appellant has
established a meritorious defense.Defendant in this case has
not merely stated denials as defense but has actually shown more
in another matter ( D84-1130) that she did not sign the
guaranty which is the basis of the respondent's action.
Statements of other witnesses in the Statement of Facts
clearly prove

that there is a good evidence for her defense

which is more than mere denials. The showing of a meritorious
defense is accomplished when allegations of defendant's
answer, if established on trial, would contitute a complete
defense to the action. Tozer v.Charles A.Krause Milling Co.,
189 F2d. at 244., Gross v. Stereo Component, systems,Inc.700
F.2d. at 123.
Second question is that of prejudicial harm to
plaintiff if the case is reopened. In this case plaintiff
-8-

has made no claim or showing that it would be prejudiced from
reopening.The court should have weighed tphe other two factors
and set aside the default judgment in thi light of the boave
cases and United Coin Meter Co. v.Seaboard C.R. 705 f.2d.839
(1983).
Thirdly, the element of cuipabie misconduct should
have been weighed properly e.g. in this qase defendant has
not only properly filed the answer but aJJso cooperated in
other proceedings such as her deposition and her phone calls
and letters to respondent's attorney to ilnqure about the
matter.In fact her letter after the judgment to respondent's
attorney after several calls on July 10, l|98b, shows her concern
over her legal matters. Appellant was handling her divorce
trial and this matter pro se with two opposing lawyers who
only exchanged comments and information to their advantage
as she has alleged in her affidavit instead of properly returning
her calls. What else amounts to sex bias f? The poor person
paid so much attention to these lagai matters that she was
frantically filing all sorts of papers an$ the very ouik of
such filings should have given an experienced lower court
some idea as >to the concern she has as-^op^Qsed to any cuipabie
misconduct.There *is no wilful

misconduct in this case which

would warrant a default judgment. Wilful jjiegiect is still an
important factor in the use of discretionary sanctions.
From Societe Internationale 357 U.S.197 (1958) to Notes of
-9-

Advisory Committee on Rules,28 U.S.C.A. Rule 37, at 45,47(Supp
1974).in Tucker Realty inc. v. Nunley, 396 P.2d. 410 (1964)
the Utah Supreme Court clearly indicated that any such conduct
must be wilful in order to impose such severe sanction.The
record on appeal in this case fails to show any such wilful
misconduct and/or neglect as to warrant a default judgment of
$200,000.00. Instead it shows that the lower court had notice
of defendant's pro se scatus [Record index No: 50] Defendant
did not know anything about a pre-trial conference and was not
on a look out and the lower court made an error in assuming
and expecting irrationally from her specially in the light of
Helgesen v. Inyangumia, 636 P.2d.10 79, in which case the Utah
Supreme Court in its wisdom considered the circumstances of
a pro se party and the case by case approach to consider all
the necessary elements of the Rules and the purposes of said
rules.
POINT

II

THE LOWER COURT MADE A.SERIOUS ERROR IN USING THE
ELEMENT OF DOUBT IN FAVOR OF RESPONDENT CONTRARY TO THE
LIBERAL CONSTRUCTION OF THE RULES 55(c) and 60(b).
"In a case of reasonable doubt such discretion is usually
exercised in favor of granting the application so as to
permit a determination of the .controversy upon the merits.
In a number of instances, statutes, and codes and the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, provide for the opening
or vacating of default judgments, and such provisions are
-10-

liberally construed ". 46 Am Jur 2d. §686 page 837-838
Please also see:Rapoport v.Sirott, 418 Pa^O/209 A.2d.421
(1965); Scherrer v. Plaza Marina Commerci41 Corp. IbCal.App.
3d 520, 94 Cal Rep.85 (1971);Southai v. Seaboard 39 Fla.Supp.124;
GTE Automatic Electric v. ARC Industries 3|51 NE 2d. 113; and
Cunningham v.White 390 So. 2d. 467 (1980) .,
It was an error to.enter a defaul|t judgment specially
in such a large sum as $200,000.00 becausel invoking such a
drastic sanction is proper only in the CLEAREST OF CASES
otherwise it just becomes a game instead o|f litigation based
on merits and the spirit of justice as embodied in the
rules and above-mentioned cases. It should |be noted that the
defendant had no pattern of any defiance tp the Court orders.
fr

When it appears that such relief is necessary to prevent

manifest injustice to the party seeking ±Z\, that the granting
of such relief will not place the adverse if>arty at any
disadvantage.." Brast v.Winding Gulf, 94 F;2d. 179; 161 A
ALR pages 1161-1202; Emerick v.Duncan Co. 146 F.688.

The Second Circuit in Gili v.Sto^ow, 240 F.2d.669
(1957) stated :
In final analysis, a court has the responsibiity
to do justice between man and man; and general principles cannot
justify denial of a party's fair day in coutft except upon
a serious showing of wilful default. Ld at 670.
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In this case there is no such showing of a wilful
default and the lower court's ruling based on three month
time limit is simply technical and without regard to human
circumstances and to the philosophy of case by case approach
to achieve the ends of justice in all fairness.In fact reasonable time limitations under FR Civ Procedure 60(b) rests within
sound discretion of trial court and absent abuse, it brings to
bear more liberal attitudes where no intervening rights nave
been atfected by passage of time between judgment and motion.
Nowicki v.United States, 536 F. 2d. 1171.
In this case appellant just did not know the
procedure otherwise she did act timely to correct the situation
as she wrote a letter to the respondent and its attorney on
July 10, 1988, which is within the three month time limits.
Further she filed the motions to set aside the default without
wasting any time as soon as she came to know the. >f acts.

POINT III.
A NOTICE SHOULD GIVE THE NECESSARY INFORMATION
AND MUST APPRISE. THE PERSON WHOSE RIGHTS ARE TO BE AFFECTED OF
WHAT IS REQUIRED OF HIM

A NOTICE MUST BE CLEAR

DEFINITE AND EXPLICIT, AND NOT AMBIGIOUS. THE NOTICE IS NOT
CLEAR UNLESS ITS MEANING CAN BE APPREHENDED WITHOUT EXPLANATION
OR ARGUMENT". 66. CJS-§.16. Notice

pages: 653-654.

In this case appellant states that she never
received the notice for pre-trial conference due to achange
-12-

of address made by her ex-husband.She further

claimed that

he has been removing the mail without her knowledge.But if
the Court were to differ it should be note|d that the pre-trial
conference notice [Record Index NO: 54] doles not specifically
states that a default shall be entered in lease of failure to
appear . It should clearly state the penality as required for
summons under Rule 4(c) because

ff

Notice tp a person has Deen

held to be binding on him only in the particular transaction in
which it is given and will not affect him In a subsequent
and independent matter". 66 CJS §19 Notice Page:669.
In this case it should be noted that it is oniv an " assumption"
that striking the pleadings means a default but it does not
convey any actual notice as required under the requirments
of due process clause. Is it fair in the first place to assume,
and secondly to assume that lay persons would or should know
the meanings of legal terms and then even know the follow
up procedure of such terms or actions ?
CONCLUSION
That the lower court has made errors in ignoring the
rules and the cases and guidelines to exerdise its discretion
under Rules 55(c) and 60(b), therefore the Idefault judgment
entered in this matter be set aside and the| ruling of the lower
court be reversed so that the matter is decided on its merits.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED:
this 10th day of June 1987.
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July 10, 1986

BBrbidge & Mitchell
2001 Elks Building
139 E. South Temple
Salt Lake City, Ut. 84111
Attention:

Richard D. Burbidge, Esq., #fK92
Stephen 8. Mitchell, Esq., #2273

Dear Sirs,
After several unsuccessful attempts to phi^ne your office, I am
writing this letter to urge your office %^ please settle the
"Dukane" obligation. • 9 • that i» a judgement on •'Bonnie Cranney".
According to the second clause of the divorce decree it reads:
"Liens and claims against the house that are related to the business
shall be S3:>am*vi and paid by the plaintiff, including the Dukane
obligation."
I am sending Dukans Corporation a copy of the decree and will
advise thes to put future correspondence io Mr. Jack Crauney.
Sincerely,

Ms. Bonnie Birch Cranney

cc:

Dukane Corporation

